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Abstract
Alternative currencies continue to develop all around the world, taking
various forms (material or immaterial) and fulfill various functions. They
are created in order to promote the local economy development and to fight
against social exclusion. They are principally aimed to low income people
(retired or unemployed people, or people who are living with a low wage). In
this paper, we analyze the particular case of virtual currency circulation inside
a local community of unemployed people. We elaborate on the assumptions
that the organization of LETS and the circulation of complementary cur-
rencies have two properties: (i) they help unemployed workers to overcome
the double coincidence of want necessity of an informal sector founded on
barter exchange; (ii) they help to maintain and develop workers’ skills outside
job, helping them to observe opportunities of employment even as long-term
unemployed workers. We study the global properties of a job market associ-
ating traditional short-term and long-term unemployment to the organization
of LETS. Using a theoretical Pissarides-style model, we find that the initial
level of trust of agents in the complementary currency(cies) but also the effec-
tive properties of this(these) currency(cies) are crucial for LETS to become
permanent institutions. We also find that if the stationary equilibrium of the
job-market includes LETS, then LETS have a positive influence on the rate
of employment, on the expected utility of employed workers, and are Pareto
improving when the benchmark case is a job market without any LETS.
JEL Classification: E42, E24
Keywords: Social currencies, complementary currencies, unemployment, in-
formal sector.
1 Introduction
According to the estimations of The World Payments Report in 2012, using demate-
rialized ways to exchange money is still increasing and even growing faster than the
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volume of dematerialized exchanges previously forecasted. The number of online
payments achieve a growth of 20% a year between 2009 and 2013, and this fore-
casted growth is faster for m-payments (payments with a mobile phone) reaching
52,7% a year during the same period around the world. It is generally considered
that mobile payment transaction volumes will be more important than credit card
payment volumes in the early twenties (World Payments Report, 2012).
At the same time, alternative currency systems continue to develop: LETS and
SEL in France which are local exchange trading systems; the Time Banks which
is a complementary currency based on the time of services exchange; the SOL in
France which is a local currency exchanged between citizens and local producers;
NU-Spaarpas in Nederland and Eco-iris in Belgium which are ecological currencies;
etc. There are currently 4000 in circulation around the world, and 60 in circulation
or planned in France (Libe´ration, 27 mai 2013).
They take two forms: a material form (cash, SOL or bonds, SEL) or an immaterial
one (centralized credit/debit systems, LETS), and they have their own characteris-
tics:
They are only devoted to private transaction (Time Banks, SEL) or open to busi-
ness transactions (SOL, LETS). They usually make possible multilateral uses: in
this case, a credit line is created after the first transaction and this credit can cir-
culate on further exchanges (SEL, Time Banks, LETS). Usually, they take the form
of complementary currency convertible in national currency (SOL) or inconvertible
(SEL), the currency storage can regularly decrease (Trueque in Argentina) or be
charged, and incomes obtained from these systems can be submitted at the same
regulations that the formal incomes (LETS). They can also offer systematic credit
to the users (LETS).
The development of such currencies is encouraged from many years by the develop-
ment of online communities. The more recent development of mobile applications
available on mobile-phones and smart-phones offers new possibilities to use these
currencies in mobile payments and transfers. Some of them have already been ex-
ploited inside local communities of unemployed people: we can easily predict that
these experiences are only at their initial phase and that they will develop as rapidly
than the rate of penetration of mobile services next years. Till now, these commu-
nities take the form of local official or informal associations (Blanc, 2005). Inside
these communities, the circulation of the parallel money promote interactions be-
tween new agents, the so-called “prosumers”, who are both producers and consumers
(Toﬄer, 1980, in J. Blanc, 2006).
A complementary currency is named ”social currency” if it reaches three goals:
localizing exchanges, boosting exchanges into the locality and transforming the na-
ture of exchanges (Blanc J., 2006). A social currency is ”an exchange system of
goods, services and knowledge organized by and for small communities by ad hoc
organizations. The community can take form of association of persons, formal or
informal” (Blanc J., 2005).
These social currencies, which are a subset of the set of parallel currencies, have
generally been created in order to promote and develop local environment and econ-
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omy and to fight against social exclusion, compensating the lack of money of their
users (Seyfang G., 2002; Blanc J., 2006). The new systems of payment generated
by these communities do not require any banking account and can then be used
by non-bancarized people. These alternatives currencies are then aimed to help
low income people to reach / maintain a minimal level of consumption. Results of
surveys realized on LETS and Time Banks in UK and in United-States show that
low-income and unemployed users are effectively the target audience of these parallel
systems of payment (Seyfang G., 2001, 2002, 2003; Collom E., 2011; Lasker J. and
al., 2011).
Indeed, a survey realized in 2006 on a Time Bank system in United-States reveals
that one-third of respondents have annual household incomes of less than $20,000
(Collom E., 2011) and a survey realized in UK in 2002 reveals that 80% of Time
Banks users are unemployed people and 70% live with less £13,000 by year (Seyfang
G., 2003).
While the development of mobile technology improves the potentiality to develop
efficient social currencies, it is then relevant to ask if this kind of parallel currencies,
could achieve their goals: fighting against social exclusion and against unemploy-
ment ?
Surveys realized in communities using a complementary currency identify the possi-
ble links between community currency membership and employment by examining
the opportunities opened up by taking part in local exchange systems.
Local currency communities are not known for creating jobs. The jobs directly cre-
ated by the system and indirect links between these systems and employability. A
survey realized in a LETS in UK reveals that only 4.9% of surveyed members have
obtained a job directly through the LETS because organizers of the community are
principally volunteers (Williams C.C. and al., 2001). Except some social monies
created in order to get job to unemployed workers, like the township-currency of
Woergl in Tirole in Austria (Gelleri C., 2009), local currency communities don’t
formaly create jobs. If they don’t, how can they help unemployed worker to re-enter
the job market?
During the unemployment period, people can suffer of irreversible damages con-
cerning a loss of motivation and a depreciation of skills (Mincer J. and Ofek H.,
1982; Pissarides C. A., 1992; Bo¨heim R. and Taylor M. P., 2002; Edin P.A. and
Gustavsson M., 2007). This issue is also evocated in the “scar theory” which in-
dicates that a long-term spell of unemployment can conduct to a depreciation of
human capital (Heckman and Borjas, 1980, in Flaig G. and al., 1993). Unemployed
are not able to maintain and improve his valuable work experience and his knowl-
edge. These damages on human capital will have long-term effects on the worker
employability that implied a “state dependence” for unemployed people. It means
that being unemployed and having been experienced a long period in unemploy-
ment decrease their probability to find a job in the future (Flaig G., and al., 1993).
That’s why it exists some “hysteresis effects” in unemployment. The first effect is
issue from the spell length of unemployment. More the spell of unemployment is
length, more human capital is lost, and more the probability for unemployed to find
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a job is low. Employers will prefer to not hire long-term unemployed due to this
human capital depreciation. The second hysteresis effect takes place during periods
of falling employment. Short-term unemployed, judged “more competitive”, than
long-term unemployed, are more likely to be hiring. Even in healthy labour market
period, unemployed person have difficulties to re-enter the labour market because
employers prefer hire employees and short-term unemployed. There are some per-
manent hysteresis effects, due to loss of skills and due to stigma from employers to
long-term unemployed, which implied that long-term unemployed are less likely to
find a job (Bourdet Y. and Persson I., 1991, 1991a).
However, this loss of skills during unemployment is not a fatality. Productivity
of an employee is related to specific competences used for a specific job. This pro-
ductivity is increasing during employment helped by informal or formal training.
More the employee stays in job, more he becomes “familiar” and competent in his
job until he reaches a top point of productivity (maximum productivity). If the
employee loses his job, he gradually losses these specific competences which was
improved by time spent on job. But, these competencies, once acquired, are not
totally lost. Once re-employed, the employee re-learns and re-reaches his maximum
productivity. Nevertheless, more the time spent in unemployment is lengthy, more
it will be lengthy to re-learn specific skills related to his job. There are factors which
determine the timeliness of skill loss: the length of time spent in employment (more
the time spent in a specific job is lengthy, less the skills are losing quickly), the
nature of skill used (some skills are more easily lost), and if the employee has used
this skill during the spell of unemployment (Johnson P.S. and Van Doorn J., 1976).
This idea of learning during employment spell is also presented in the “learning by
doing” theory. Workers learn from experiences. The amount of skills accumulated
is positively correlated with time spent in activity and his depreciation is positively
correlated with non-use of it (Killingsworth M.R., 1982; Mincer J. and Ofek H.,
1982; Desjardins R. and Warnke A.J., 2012).
If these specific skills can be maintain and actualized by “traditional” training and
internship programs during the spell of unemployment (Bourdet Y. and Persson I.,
1991), there is another way. As seen previously, communities using a social currency
don’t formally create jobs. However, they can improve the individual employabil-
ity. To join these communities, members need to procure a good or a service to
sell to other members. To produce this good or service, they need cash in order to
launch their activity. Even if in some communities members can obtain a credit in
community currency, unemployed people remain ressourceless (credit offered by the
community can be insufficient to launch an activity and unemployment benefit is
usually used for current consumption). That’s why they will offer to other members
an activity, essentially services, related to their previous job, activity for which they
have required skills and for which they don’t have to invest in order to create the ser-
vice. Launching a new activity (or a secondary activity), not related to the previous
job, would be risky for unemployed people because it would require costly material
and immaterial investments with no guarantee of return on investment (Peacock
M.S., 2001). By offering an activity related to their previous, unemployed people
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have the possibility to maintain and actualize their specific skills and, in this way,
improve their employability.
Communities using their own currency are surroundings to develop a sort of
self-employment jobs - or to serve as a springboard for access to self-employment
(Gomez and Helmsing, 2008; Williams C.C. and al., 2001). Unemployed people
transform their specific competences in revenue and purchasing power without risks
encountered by launching a formal self-employment activity: no administrative and
accounting burdens, customer base is already composed by community’s members,
opportunity to assess the relevance of the activity.
Loss of skills is not the only problem that unemployed people need to confront.
With job loss, unemployed tend to lose their social network. As a consequence,
they lose a part of information particularly about job opportunities and new activ-
ity development (Williams C.C., 1996). Communities using a social currency could
help unemployed people to re-create a social link. Thanks to surveys conducted on
members of community currency exchange systems, this help is revealed real. Com-
munity currency exchange systems give them opportunity to re-construct and to
extend their social network (Williams C.C., 1996; Seyfang G., 2001) and know more
local people (Seyfang G., 2003), to belong in a collectivity (Lasker J. and al., 2011),
to again participate actively in the life of their community with help of coordinators
who bring members together (Seyfang G., 2002), and to develop relationship skills
(Seyfang G., 2001; Ozanne L.K., 2010).
The scope of the present paper is to explore the influence of social virtual currency
circulation between unemployed workers into a community on job market and em-
ployed workers welfare through benefits resulting of exchanges into this community
on employability and social links of unemployed workers. Thanks to the possibilities
offered by the complementary currency/cies in LETS, unemployed workers exchange
each other services and goods for an extra income. This is a first property of LETS.
To offer these products, they maintain their levels of skills and competences, and
particularly the levels of those skills related to their previous jobs (Peacock M.S.,
2001). We then assume in this paper that participating in a LETS avoid any loss of
skills and productivity during unemployment spell, as already pointed out by liter-
ature (Mincer J. and Ofek H., 1982; Pissarides C. A., 1992; Bo¨heim R. and Taylor
M. P., 2002; Edin P.A. and Gustavsson M., 2007) and increases for LETS members
the instantaneous probability to be recruited (Flaig G., and al., 1993). In these
assumption, we ask three research questions: (i) on which condition such LETS can
maintain or not at equilibrium? (ii) Witch is the influence of such LETS on the
level of employment? (iii) What is the effect of LETS on welfare?
The following sections answer these questions using a benchmark model analyz-
ing the transition of workers between three positions on the job market: workers can
occupy a job position, they ca, also be short-term unemployed workers or long term
unemployed workers. We then study the changes in the stationary equilibrium of
this job market after the introduction of LETS. The main results of this setting are
(i) that trust inside and outside LETS are important determinants of the perma-
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nence of LETS, (ii) that when permanent, LETS increase the level of employment,
(iii) that in this case, they improve welfare without generating conflicts of interest.
2 The benchmark model
The benchmark model depicts an economy with n workers where the probability to
observe employment opportunities decreases during the time each worker remains
unemployed. To simplify the setting we suppose that the in the economy, workers
can take three possible positions:
- Employed workers are in proportion e of the total active population. They earn
the periodic wage w and have the probability q to lose their job at the end of the
period.
Unemployed people distribute in two sub-categories.
- Short-term unemployed workers are in proportion s: they receive the unemploy-
ment benefit b and have the probability α to find a job during the current period.
If they do not observe an opportunity of employment, they integrate the group of
the long-term unemployed workers.
- Long-term unemployed workers are in proportion l. They receive the same
unemployment benefit b than the short-term unemployed ones but their probability
to observe an opportunity to employment is only α′ with α′ < α (1).
Figure 1: Transition pattern in the benchmark model
The model is analyzed at stationary equilibrium, which is a state such that (i) the
number of employed and unemployed workers remains constant during time, once
the environment remains unchanged, and (ii) the expected intertemporal utility a
worker occupying a given position is also constant during time. The condition (i)
determines stationary amounts of e, s, and l satisfying equations (3), (2) and (??):
qe = αs+ α′l (1)
6
qe = s (2)
(1− α)s = α′l (3)
with by definition, e+s+l = 1. Solving the system gives the equilibrium level of em-
ployment e = α
′
(1−α)q+α′(1−q) , Studying in comparative statics this expression shows
that employment increases with the capacity to find a new job in each position of the
job market, and with a decrease of the rate of destruction q of existing employment
positions. Long term unemployed workers are in proportion l = q(1−α)
q(1−α)+α′(1+q) and
short term unemployed ones are in proportion s = α
′q
q(1−α)+α′(1+q) . A comparative
static analysis shows that their number increases with the increase of the rate of
destruction of jobs q and decreases with an increase of the capacity α to find a job
as short term worker or as a long term unemployed worker α′.
The intertemporal utility associated with each position after consumption is
deduced from the Bellman equations (4) to (6)
Ve = (1− q) w + Ve
(1 + r)
+ q
b+ Vs
(1 + r)
(4)
Vs = α
w + Ve
(1 + r)
+ (1− α) b+ Vl
(1 + r)
(5)
Vl = α
′ w + Ve
(1 + r)
+ (1− α′) b+ Vl
(1 + r)
(6)
where Ve, Vs and Vl figure respectively the intertemporal utilities of an employed
worker, a short-term unemployed worker and a long-term unemployed one, after
consumption while w and b represent respectively the instantaneous wage of an em-
ployed worker and the unemployment benefit of an unemployed worker1. The system
(4) to (6) also solves and gives the equilibrium values of the intertemporal utility
in each position that a worker can occupy on the labor market. The instantaneous
components of their utilities are respectively given by the monetary value of wages
w and of the unemployment benefit b. The system solves easily. Each intertemporal
utility is a function of the parameters q, α, α′ but also w and b. The study of Ve,
Vs and Vl in comparative statics states that (see Appendix 1) each intertemporal
utility increases with w, b, α and α′ and decreases when q increases. All these
relations are intuitive: smaller is the probability of a worker to be fired, greater
is his utility in each position of the job market. The same intuition is confirmed
concerning the influence of the potentiality to be hired when unemployed and util-
ities. The other relations comparative statics properties have also intuitive contents.
1We suppose as a simplifying assumption that this benefit does not vary with the time each
worker remains unemployed. When this decreases during time - which is a reasonable assumption
-, the results of the paper are strengthened.
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3 Introducing a LETS
A LETS is introduced in this section as a network providing three kinds of services.
1. It encourages unemployed workers to stay active and to produce for the equiv-
alent of a monetary utility b′. This value, when added to the other unemployment
benefits compatible with this activity is supposed at least equal to b2.
2. LETS provide also a complementary currency. This additional currency is useful
for avoiding unemployed people to face the “double coincidence of needs” condition.
The complementary currency then increases the efficiency of exchanges in the in-
formal sector. However, a complementary currency is not as easily acceptable than
official currencies. This acceptability depends on two different components. One is
the effective size c of the LETS. Wider is the LETS, easier is for each unemployed
complementary currency holder to find an agent able to accept this currency as a
mean of payment. The other is the organization and the reliability of the LETS.
Better is the organization and the reliability of the LETS, greater is the confidence in
the complementary currency, then the propensity to the LETS members to accept it.
When the complementary currency has all the properties of the official currency,
the instantaneous utility of an unemployed worker in the LETS is given by b′. When
the size or organization of the LETS are not optimal, the utility of each unemployed
worker inside the LETS is given by λb′ where 0 ≤ lambda < 1 increases with
the acceptability of the complementary currency. The specification λ = ac(2 − c)
expresses the required properties of the acceptability where a is an index of the LETS
good governance (0 ≤ a ≤ 1). The signs of the derivatives in c (λ′c > 0, λ′′c < 0) on
the definition space of c, expresses that the acceptability of the currency increases
with the size of the LETS, while the capacity to exchange of a member of the LETS
is limited by his capacity to supply / to produce more.
3. Because they are active in the LETS, the LETS maintains the level of skill of
unemployed workers and their capacity to find a job in each period as long term
unemployed workers with an unchanged probability α that they have as short term
unemployed ones. The LETS plays then the role of a “learning by doing device”.
3.1 Confidence in the complementary currency outside the
LETS
Outside LETS, the term b′ is perfectly observable: it depends on the efficiency of the
“production technology” outside industrial organization. The term λ witch corre-
sponds to currency acceptability is not. Outside LETS, workers have heterogeneous
levels of confidence in the properties of the complementary currency and in the po-
tentiality of the LETS in general. The size c the LETS is however observable and
2Suppose indeed that b′ is smaller that the unemployment benefit b. In this case, unemployed
workers have interest to work for free if they draw other advantages from LETS or to leave them
if they have no other interest to stay in.
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has an influence on the heterogeneity and the level of confidence of outsiders. When
LETS are very small, the level of confidence in the complementary currency is also
very small for all outsiders. When the LETS is very large, the level of confidence is
also hight and quite identical for all outsiders. In between, there is a higher degree
of heterogeneity among the level of trust of outsiders 3. To capture this variation of
the distribution of beliefs in function of c, we suppose that agents’ expectations are
uniformly distributed on the segment [c2, c] whatever the observable size of c.
λi, (i = {1, 2, . . . , n}),
of λ by the agent , is un
Suppose as a working assumption that the levels of confidence of employed work-
ers on the reliability of complementary currency are then given by a coefficient λ
defined on a segment [0, 1]. When λi is close to 0, worker i has a low level of confi-
dence into the complementary currency; when λi is close to 1, this level of confidence
is conversely high.
With LETS, A fourth position then emerges for workers, besides the three po-
sitions analyzed in the benchmark model. It corresponds to the participation to a
LETS. The transition process between the four possible positions of the job market
are then depicted by Fig (2):
Figure 2: Transition pattern in the model with LETS
With the introduction of the LETS, when an employee loses his/her job, he/she
becomes an unemployed worker and faces two possibilities: becoming a “traditional”
unemployed worker (namely a short-term unemployed worker) or participating in
a LETS. A short-term unemployed worker can also decide to join a LETS before
becoming a long-term unemployed worker. When inside a LETS, an unemployed
worker experiences the complementary currency and its level of confidence evolves
upward or downward. This level then evolves from it initial level λi to λ with
0 < λ ≤ 1. λ reflects the effective properties of the LETS and depends both of the
3essayer de justifier cette distribution avec d’autres situations d’incertitude
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objective reliability of the complementary currency and of the organization of the
LETS. As a first approximation, λ will be taken as given 4.
As there are two possible positions that unemployed workers can occupy outside
LETS, there are also two possibilities to join LETS for unemployed people, namely
joining them directly just after being fired, or after a first attempt to recover a job
as a short term unemployed worker. As it is more valuable to be a short term un-
employed worker than a long term one, workers joining LETS directly correspond
only to the highest values of λi. Those joining them only after a while correspond to
smaller values of λi as they are only interested in LETS when there have to choose
between LETS and the few efficient long-term unemployment worker position. A
second consequence can then be deduced from the above assumptions: it is expressed
in Lemma 1.
Lemma 1. If an unemployed worker integrates a LETS with a level of trust λi
smaller than the level of trust λ of the unemployed workers inside LETS all workers
integrating LETS only leave them as employed workers.
Proof: Consider the worker i such that λi < λ. If this worker is a short-term unem-
ployed worker having failed to find a job, his/her choice is between becoming a long
term unemployed worker, i.e. having an utility equal to (1− α′) b+Vl(λi)
(1+r)
+ α′w+Ve(λi)
(1+r)
and becoming a member of a LETS, i.e., having an utility equal to Vc(λi) =
(1−α)λib′+Vc(λi)
(1+r)
+αw+Ve(λi)
(1+r)
. If he/she chooses to integrate a LETS, the second term
is greater than the first one. When this same unemployed worker is inside the LETS,
his/her intertemporal expected utility is Vc(λ) = (1−α)λb′+Vc(λ)(1+r) +αw+Ve(λ)(1+r) if he/she
remains in the LETS and (1− α′) b+Vl(λi)
(1+r)
+ α′w+Ve(λi)
(1+r)
if he/she leaves the LETS. It
is easy to verify that if Vc(λi) = (1 − α)λib′+Vc(λi)(1+r) + αw+Ve(λi)(1+r) > (1 − α′) b+Vl(λi)(1+r) +
α′w+Ve(λi)
(1+r)
, then Vc(λ) = (1− α)λb′+Vc(λ)(1+r) + αw+Ve(λ)(1+r) > (1− α′) b+Vl(λi)(1+r) + α′w+Ve(λi)(1+r) 
Note that if all the agents choosing to join the LETS have a level of confidence
in the complementary currency greater than λ, the LETS can emerge or not at
equilibrium. Suppose for instance that the agent i with the smallest λi choosing
to join the LETS is such that λi is far greater than λ: in this case, one may have
(λib
′ + Vc(λ)) < b + Vl but (λib′ + Vc(λi)) > b + Vl. With an out-of-equilibrium
analysis, we could then observe there a temporary emergence of the LETS followed
by their rapid collapse.
Another property on utilities is interesting to prove:
Lemma 2. When a worker i never chooses to integrate a LETS, his/her intertem-
poral utility does not depend on his/her level of confidence in the LETS.
Proof: When the agent i is in this case, its instantaneous utility is given by w when
he/she is employed, or b when he/she is unemployed. Accordingly, his/her expected
4In a more complex setting, λ could be made dependent on time and on the members of the
LETS.
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utility never depends on λi 
At last a third interesting property is easy to prove:
Lemma 3. At stationary equilibrium, all workers (employed or not) devoted to join
LETS when unemployed, expect (perfectly) at its level λ the trust of the complemen-
tary currency inside the LETS.
Proof: Suppose that its remains employed workers with a level of trust λi such that
λi 6= λ and planning to join LETS when fired. Then, the expected utility of these
agent as employed workers will move subsequently, once they will have joined LETS.
We are then not yet at stationary equilibrium. At stationary equilibrium, all cur-
rent, past or future participants to the LETS are then the same perfect evaluation
λ of the acceptability of the complementary currency 
With the help of lemmas (1) to (3), the stationary equilibrium of the economy
can be deduced.
3.2 The equilibrium size of the LETS
Like for the benchmark model, the stationary equilibrium is characterized by the sta-
tionarity of the population and of the expected intertemporal individual utilities in
each position of the job market. Given lemmas 1, 2 and 3, if stationary equilibrium
exists, two distinct subpopulations then coexist. The first sub-population gathers
workers integrating LETS when unemployed and expecting perfectly the level of ac-
ceptability of the complementary currency / the level of efficiency of the LETS. The
second sub-population is characterized by those workers who remain outside LETS
when unemployed. Their level of trust in the complementary currency / evaluation
of the efficiency of the LETS are heterogeneous but as they do not use LETS, this
heterogeneity has no influence of their utility, whatever the position they occupy on
the job market. The threshold agent separating the two sub-population is the agent
i∗ such that λ∗i is just sufficient to decide him/her to join the LETS if he/she is not
recruited directly as a short-term unemployed worker and not leaving this LETS
after having observed λ. Knowing λ∗i is then crucial to determine the size of the two
sub-populations.
Note that the stationary equilibrium can correspond to cases where the LETS
finally collapse. It is the case when λ is very small. In this cases, all unemployed
workers integrating initially the LETS finally leave it for the traditional long-run
unemployment position. We could consider that this situation becomes realistic if
the development of the informal sector in the LETS convinces Government to un-
dertake actions able to cut the unemployment benefits of the members of the LETS
or to make the use of complementary currencies illegal. It is also the case if there
are more classical crises of confidence with non-reliable management of the comple-
mentary currency inside the LETS.
If we concentrate on the cases where the LETS does not collapses, the agent i∗,
is obtained as the solution of the following equations system of 7 equations:
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Vs(λi) = α
w + Ve(λi)
(1 + r)
+ (1− α) λib
′ + Vc(λi)
(1 + r)
(7)
Ve(λi) = (1− q) w + Ve(λi)
(1 + r)
+ q
b+ Vs(λi)
(1 + r)
(8)
Vc(λi) = α
w + Ve(λi)
(1 + r)
+ (1− α) λb
′ + Vc(λi)
(1 + r)
(9)
Equations (7) to (9) solve in Ve(λi), Vs(λi), and Vc(λi), providing then, a a
function of λi, the expected intertemporal utilities in each position he/she stays, of
a worker planning to integrate a LETS after the tradition short-term unemployment
position. The following equations (10) to (12) correspond to the expressions of the
expected intertemporal utilities for the workers preferring not to integrate LETS
when they are unemployed.
Vs = α
w + Ve
(1 + r)
+ (1− α) b+ Vl
(1 + r)
(10)
Ve = (1− q) w + Ve
(1 + r)
+ q
b+ Vs
(1 + r)
(11)
Vl = α
′ w + Ve
(1 + r)
+ (1− α′) b+ Vl
(1 + r)
(12)
Note that equations (10) to (12) replicate exactly the benchmark utility equations
(4) to (6) since the situation/utility of workers never joining LETS hoes not changed
with the introduction of LETS. Finally, the seventh equation is obtained equalizing
expressions of Vs(λi) obtained as solution of the system (7) to (9) and of Vs solution
of the system (10) to (12), as a function of parameters (w, b, b′, q, α, α′). Lemma 4
summarizes this stage of the resolution of the model:
Lemma 4. When LETS do not collapse, the proportion of workers integrating
LETS when they are unemployed is given by (1 − λ∗i ) where λ∗i expresses as λ∗i =
b(1+g(−1+α+q−αgq+α′gq))+(−α+α′)gw
b′(1+g(−1+α′+q−αgq+α′gq)) with g =
1
(1+r)
Proof: see Appendix 2.
Despite this expression of the size of “LETS’ current, past and future members”
sub-population given by (1−λ∗i ) is not so simple, one can easily verify that this size
increases with α and decreases with α′, i.e. increases with the depreciation of the
potentiality to be recruited when moving from the position of short-term unemployed
worker to long term one. Comparative statics also shows that this population is
growing - as intuition would expect it - with λb, i.e., with the performances of the
complementary currency and more generally of the organization of the LETS.
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3.3 Effects of complementary currency and LETS on em-
ployment and welfare
It is now possible to solve the remaining equations providing the missing conditions
to determine the instantaneous size of the LETS at equilibrium, the level of equilib-
rium employment and the proportion of agents remaining instantaneously outside of
LETS as unemployed workers. These proportions are solution of the system made
by equations (13) to (16)
qe = αs+ αc+ α′l (13)
qλ∗i e = s (14)
(1− α)s = α′l (15)
(1− λ∗i )s = αc (16)
with by definition, e+ s+ l + c = 1.
The system solves easily5 and provides the stationary proportions of workers,
occupying each position (e∗, s∗, l∗, c∗) of the job-market when the stationary equi-
librium includes non-empty LETS. These expressions are complex combinations of
the parameters but however help to provide the two main results of the paper:
Proposition 1. When LETS do not collapse, they increase the level of employment
Proof: see Appendix 3.
This result interprets easily: as they help workers to find a job easily, LETS in-
crease the supply-side efficiency of the job-market. When workers are unemployed,
with the help of the LETS technology (including the complementary currency),
long-term unemployed workers maintain their competencies at the same level they
had as short-term unemployed workers. Without considering any feed-back from
the job-market demand side, the global effect of the LETS is the to enhance the
employability of unemployed people and results in a global positive effect on the
job-market and on the employment level6.
The result of Proposition 1 is strengthened by the following proposition:
Proposition 2. The intertemporal utility of employed workers increases at station-
ary equilibrium when there are active LETS
5with the help of Mathematica software as the previous ones
6In another paper, the authors present an analysis of the demand-side effect, in a bi-sectoral
model, involving a first-necessity goods sector and a technological goods one. The effect of LETS
in founded positive on the demand side of the technological goods sector, negative on the first-
necessity (formal) goods sector and ambiguous at the aggregate level (M. Della Peruta and D.
Torre, 2012)
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Proof: Employed people e associate two sub-populations. The first has the size
λ∗i e and gathers all workers who do not integrate LETS when there exist. Fore
this population, the expected intertenmporal utility given by Ve is the same than in
the benchmark model. The second sub-population has the size (1 − λ∗i )e. The
expected intertemporal utility of each member of this second sub-population of
“LETS users” (when they are unemployed) is given by Ve(λ), solution of the sys-
tem (7) to (9) where λi is taken equal to λ. Calculations provide the value u =
g(b(−1+g−αg)q+(−1+α)b′αλiq+(−1+q−g(−1+α+q))w)
(−1+g)(1+g(−1+α+q)) with g =
1
1+r
which is greater than Ve.
The “average expected utility” λ∗iVe + (1 − λ∗i )Ve(λ) is then greater than Ve which
corresponds to the expected intertenporal utility of employed people in the bench-
mark model 
A last proposition proves that there are not conflicts of interest when LETS are
used by unemployed workers.
Proposition 3. LETS are Pareto-improving when compared to the benchmark sit-
uation without LETS
Proof: For all agents ıˆ such that i < i∗, the expected intertemporal utility does not
change with LETS, whatever the position they have on the job market. For the
other ones, the utility strictly increases in each position (when we substitute to the
“inside LETS” position to the long-term unemployment position). These observa-
tions correspond a Pareto-improving situation 
As the organization of LETS and the use of the complementary currency(ies) do
not weaken the properties of the traditional unemployment positions and decrease
the advantages of those choosing to remain outside LETS when they are unemployed.
This is why, the results of this model does not exhibit any conflicts of interest with
the introduction of LETS. However, only the supply side of the job-market has
been considered. With the introduction of the demand side, the informal activity
generated by LETS may decrease the demand of employees in the formal sector and
have a negative effect on some formal employs and utilities. Intuitively, smaller is the
substitution between the goods and services circulation in LETS and outside them,
or greater is the additional revenue generated in LETS allowing LETS’s members
to buy goods not available in LETS, greater is the propensity for LETS to have a
positive effect on the job-market demand size 7.
4 Concluding remarks
This paper analyzes the global effects of a social virtual currency circulation between
unemployed workers into a community. We estimate that participating on a social
currency system enables unemployed workers to maintain their skills, avoiding hu-
man capital depreciation occurring during unemployment spell, and to preserve and
extend their social network. These benefits have a positive effects on unemployed
workers employability and enable them to re-enter the job market more quickly. We
7see Della Peruta, Torre, 2012
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first introduce a benchmark Pissarides-style model with two possible position for
unemployed workers: short term unemployed workers have a higher instantaneous
probability to find a job than long term ones. We then introduce LETS having two
properties: (i) to improve, thanks to the complementary currency, the potentiality
to exchange goods and services in the informal sector, and (ii) to maintain profes-
sional skills outside job. We find that trust in the complementary currency outside
LETS and in LETS are crucial to make LETS permanent (to avoid LETS collapse).
When LETS are permanent, we find that they increase employment, the level of
expected utility of employed workers, and are Pareto-improving when compared to
the benchmark case without LETS.
An out-of equilibrium analysis, founded on numerical simulation could be inter-
esting to observe the phases of emergence or collapse of LETS. Another extension
would be to add demand-side effects generated by LETS on the job-market, i.e. the
capacity of LETS to increase or not the demand for the goods and services produced
by the formal sector.
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Appendix
Appendix 1: The benchmark model
Derivation of e, s, and l:

αs+ α′l = qe
(1− α′)s = α′l
e+ s+m = 1
e = − α′−α′−q+αq−α′q
l = q(−1+α)−α′−q+αq−α′q
s = − α′q−α′−q+αq−α′q
Derivation of Ve, Vs, and Vl:
x = (1− q) 1
1+r
w + qb 1
1+r
+ (1− q) 1
1+r
x+ q 1
1+r
y
y = αw 1
1+r
+ (1− α)b 1
1+r
+ α 1
1+r
x+ (1− α) 1
1+r
t
t = α′w 1
1+r
+ (1− α′) 1
1+r
b+ α′ 1
1+r
x+ (1− α′) 1
1+r
t
with x = Ve, y = Vs, t = Vl
x = bg((−1+αg−α
′g)q+g(−1+g−α′g+(−1+g)(−1+αg−α′g)q)w)
(−1+g)(1+g(−1+α′+q−αgq+α′gq))
y = bg(−1+α+g−αg+g(−1+αg−g)q)+g(α(−1+g)−α
′g)w)
(−1+g)(1+g(−1+α′+q−αgq+α′gq))
t = bg(−1+α
′+g−α′g+g(−1+αg−α′g)q)−α′gw)
(−1+g)(1+g(−1+α′+q−αgq+α′gq))
g = 1
1+r
The comparative static analysis is made after expressing the derivatives of x = Ve
according to q, α and α′.
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∂x
∂q
= bg(−1+αg−α
′g)+(−1+g)g(−1+αg−α′g)w
(−1+g)(1+g(−1+α′+q−αgq+α′gq))2 −
g(1+(−1+α′)g)(−1+αg−α′g)(b−w)
(−1+g)(1+g(−1+α′+q−αgq+α′gq))2
∂x
∂α
= g
2(1+(−1+α′)g)q(b−w)
(−1+g)(1+g(−1+α′+q−αgq+α′gq))2
∂x
∂α′ =
(−1+α)g3q(b−w)
(−1+g)(1+g(−1+α′+q−αgq+α′gq))2
Given the definition values of parameters, the first term is always negative, while
the other ones are still positive.
Appendix 2: The model with LETS
Proof of Lemma 4:
Expression of Ve, Vs, and Vl:
x = (1− q) 1
1+r
w + (1− q) 1
1+r
x+ q 1
1+r
b+ q 1
1+r
y
y = αw 1
1+r
+α 1
1+r
x+ (1− α)b 1
1+r
+ (1− α) 1
1+r
z
z = α′w 1
1+r
+ α′ 1
1+r
x+ (1− α′)b 1
1+r
+ (1− α′) 1
1+r
z
with x = Ve, y = Vs, and z = Vl . These variables express as:
x = bg(−1+αg−α
′g)q+g(−1+g−α′g+(−1+g)(−1+αg−α′g)q)w)
(−1+g)(1+g(−1+α′+q−αgq+α′gq))
y = bg(−1+α+g−αg+g+g(−1+αg−α
′g)q)+g(α(−1+g)−α′g)w
(−1+g)(1+g(−1+α′+q+αgq+α′gq))
z = bg(−1+α
′+g−α′g+g(−1+αg−α′g)q)−α′gw
(−1+g)(1+g(−1+α′+q−αgq+α′gq))
with g = 1
1+r
Expression of Ve(λi), Vs(λi), and Vc(λi):

u = (1− q)w 1
1+r
+ (1− q) 1
1+r
u+ q 1
1+r
b+ q 1
1+r
v
v = α 1
1+r
w + α 1
1+r
u+ (1− α) 1
1+r
λib
′ + (1− α) 1
1+r
t
t = α 1
1+r
w + α 1
1+r
u+ (1− α)λib′ 11+r + (1− α) 11+r t
with x = Ve(λi), y = Vs(λi), t = Vc(λi). These variables express as:
u = g(b(−1+g−αg)q+(−1+α)b
′αλiq+(−1+q−g(−1+α+q))w)
(−1+g)(1+g(−1+α+q))
v = g((−1+α)b
′λi(1+g(−1+q))−α(bgq+w))
(−1+g)(1+g(−1+α+q))
t = g((−1+α)b
′λi(1+g(−1+q))−α(bgq+w))
(−1+g)(1+g(−1+α+q))
with g = 1
1+r
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Derivation of λ∗: the threshold value λ∗i of the level of trust of the agent indifferent
between integrating a LETS or joining the long-term unemployed worker position
is given after equalizing Vs and Vs(λi):
g((−1+α)b′λi(1+g(−1+q))−α(bgq+w))
(−1+g)(1+g(−1+α+q)) =
bg(−1+α+g−αg+g+g(−1+αg−α′g)q)+g(α(−1+g)−α′g)w
(−1+g)(1+g(−1+α′+q+αgq+α′gq))
The solution is λ∗i =
b(1+g(−1+α+q−αgq+α′gq))+(−α+α′)gw
b′(1+g(−1+α′+q−αgq+α′gq)) .
Proof of Proposition 1:
Derivation of e, s, l, and c: These sub-populations are obtained as solutions of the
following system:

αc+ αs+ α′l = qe
q(b(1+g(−1+α+q−αgq+α′gq)))
b′(1+g(−1+α′+q−αgq+α′gq)) e = s
(1− α)s = α′l
f + e+ s+m = 1
The solutions are:
c =
q
(
α2g(2α′+q)(b(−1+gq)+w)−α(b(−2α′(−1+g)+q+g(−1+α′(3+2α′g))q+gq2)+α′g(b′gq+2α′w))+α′(b′(1+g(−1+α′+q+α′gq))−q(b(1+g(−1+q+α′gq))+α′gw))
)
α′b′(α+q)(1+g(−1+α′+q−αgq+α′gq))
e =
α
(
αq(b(−1+g−αg+g(−1+αg)q)+αgw)+α′2g(b′+b′gq+q(bgq+w))+α′(bq−b′(−1+g+g(−1+αg)q)+gq(b(−1+α+q−2αgq)−2αw))
)
α′b′(α+q)(1+g(−1+α′+q−αgq+α′gq))
s =
q
(
b(1+g(−1+α+q−αgq+α′gq))+(−α+α′)gw
)
b′(1+g(−1+α′+q−αgq+α′gq))
l =
αq
(
b(1+g(−1+α+q−αgq+α′gq))+(−α+α′)gw)
)
α′b′(1+g(−1+α′+q−αgq+α′gq))
A comparison between the values of e in the benchmark model and with LETS
shows that, whatever the values of parameters:
− α′−α′−q+αq−α′q <
α
(
αq(b(−1+g−αg+g(−1+αg)q)+αgw)+α′2g(b′+b′gq+q(bgq+w))+α′(bq−b′(−1+g+g(−1+αg)q)+gq(b(−1+α+q−2αgq)−2αw))
)
α′b′(α+q)(1+g(−1+α′+q−αgq+α′gq)) .
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